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Effect our Soul of

21 March 1972

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT :

Suggested Outline for Paper Responding to Secretary Laird's Request for Net Assessment of DHV/HVNAF Forces

1. We envisage a paper in two parts: (a) the main memorandum, about 20 pages in length, and (b) annexes giving all the facts and figures we can muster in the time allowed to us. (The deadline for the finished product is 15 April 1972.)

- The main memorandum would include the following sections.
 - (a) Summary (two pages or so).
 - (b) Introductory statement explaining that the main question we are trying to answer is whether or not the HVNAF will be able to continue the war largely on its own after this year. Indicate that we assume (1) no negotiated settlement, (2) a continuing basic stability of the present governments in both SVN and NVN, (3) no changes of the situation in Laos or Cambodia of such magnitude as to induce either SVN or NVN to quit the war, and (4) a continuation of outside aid to both SVN and NVN at roughly present levels. We also assume a continuing, though diminishing, U.S. air and naval air combat role.
 - (c) Comparison of quantitative strengths as of 1 January 1972 and 1 January 1973 for RVNAF and DRV forces. This will get us into the old numbers game on both main and local forces, but at least we don't have to coordinate with anybody. In annex, we should back this up, if possible, with more detailed tables of enemy strength in and targetted against each MR of South Vietnam, compared with HVNAF strength in each MR plus JGS reserve. Should also have tables of NVA strengths targetted against Cambodia and Laos. Finally, there should be separate tables on VNAF and DRV Air Forces, and on North and South Vietnamese navies, if possible.

(d) Qualitative discussion of the leadership, morale, training, and equipment of the forces of both sides.

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In annex, we should include whatever tables can be worked up on comparative equipment, length of training, ratings of ARWN officers, desertion rates, etc. Might be useful to include a discussion of desertion as a problem for both ARWN and NVA.

- (e) Evaluation of RVNA F's ability, on the basis of the above factors, to carry on on its own after this year. Emphasizing that this is our best judgment, point out that a very big unknown is the future level of Soviet and Chinese aid to NVN. Then go on to discuss each of the questions on page 2 of General Pursley's memorandum, all of which are related to the level of Soviet and Chinese aid.
- (f))Conclusion (about a page)